Donald Trump’s reprehensible insistence on the truth of his false memory of American Muslim celebrations over 9/11 has been roundly contested.  Politifact’s is here.  This is a very dangerous and disappointing turn.  Its implications will be explored by others, but I want to make a brief comment about the mediation of it all.

The years since 9/11 have actually been a time of remarkable restraint on the part of whatever American impulses toward Islamophobia might lurk beneath the surface.  Trump has succeeded in calling them forth, tapping sentiments that can easily constitute some very dark stresses and impulses in American domestic and foreign policy.

This is how the media imaginary works.  It is a “cultural forum” through which things that might not make sense in practical terms can make sense in imagined normative spaces that can exist unmoored from reality.  And, rhetorics such as Trump’s must at the same time refer to media and mediation for “evidence.”  Did Trump see what he says he saw?  He would have to have seen it on television. Yet, no evidence, no tape, no reporting, no cultural memory exists.  And yet a cultural memory does exist, or rather can be fabricated and can take on vivid reality because it “..just makes sense…” to the manichean worldview Trump inhabits.

And it is calling this fabricated memory into being for his followers, too, according to this Morning’s NPR coverage of the issue.

And it is Trump’s confidence, in the face of truth or reality, that is his most endearing quality, apparently.  Being confident about something that makes cultural sense is a dangerous quality in political affairs.

ISIS continues to roil American public and political discourse.  It is a challenge, too, for those of us who work on relations between religion and media, because it is a fascinating modern expression of their interaction.  I’ll obviously have more to say, but for now I thought I’d pretend that I’m a presidential candidate in one of the debates answering one of those insipid “lightning round” of questions:

  1. Is ISIS an existential threat to the US?  No
  2. Is ISIS a threat to our “way of life?” Only if we let it be
  3. Is ISIS a threat to our foreign policy goals in the Middle East and Beyond? Yes
  4. Does ISIS undermine our carefully-crafted-decades-long balance-of-power approach in that region?  Yes
  5. Is ISIS a religious movement?  Yes and No
  6. Is ISIS a media phenomenon?  Yes, in a number of different ways
  7. Would ground combat in the region, directly or indirectly involving the US, complicate matters? Yes
  8. Can Israel help in any major way?  No
  9. Can Iran help in any major way? Maybe, but….
  10. Is getting the Kurds more involved a simple solution to the problem?  No
  11. Should Turkey be doing more about this? Yes
  12. Would portraying this as a global struggle between “Islam” and “the West” benefit US or ISIS?  ISIS
  13. Does stigmatizing Muslim refugees aid ISIS? Yes
  14. Do some of our own actions in the past and some of our supposed “friends” in the region share the blame for the rise of ISIS?  Yes
  15. Is there a hidden lever of power somewhere in the Oval Office that, if grasped, will solve foreign policy dilemmas like ISIS?  Only presidential candidates seem to know of its existence
  16. Has ISIS completed the undoing of the traditional bipartisan approach to foreign policy in the US, making it instead subject to the whims of election-year politics?  Yes
  17. Is there any vital interest of the US that ISIS has succeeded in destroying?  See # 16

Stay tuned.

I’ve been working for some time now on the question of how contemporary moral struggles emerge in public media.

A piece in today’s New York Times about the “anger” Germans are feeling toward Greece brought some things into focus.  As I thought about that “anger” (and when did it become appropriate for reporters to accept–and report on–“anger” as a valid political position?) of Germans contemplating supposedly profligate Greeks, Spaniards, Portuguese, and Italians, I also thought about the so-called “anger” that many in the US seem to feel regarding recent social evolution here.

As a scholar of media and religion, I am particularly curious about how religion relates to such struggles in modern, developed societies such as those in Europe and North America.  Fortunately for me, some contemporary examples have emerged for me to study.  I’ll be doing a longer blog post on our Center Blog presently, but here I’d like to link two discussions:

1. the Eurozone Crisis–particularly focused on the PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain) countries–lately focused on the Greek situation, and

2. the fallout from the recent SCOTUIS decision on gay marriage.

Each of these invokes a category that deserves much more attention: the “social imaginary.”  Many will be familiar with this concept from Benedict Anderson’s book in Imagined Communities.  The basic idea is that cultures and nations are knitted together not only by material realities of geography, kinship, economy, state, etc., but by commonly-accepted (but also negotiated) “imaginaries.”  they are imagined communities as much as they are real.  In fact they are made real through their collective imagination.

Cultural scholars are starting to use the term “imaginary” (as a noun) to describe these collective products.  There is a lot that could be said, of course, but let me focus on one dimension of this: the fact that imaginaries can be particularly compelling because they can imagine literally anything and they can also imagine perfection. That is, regardless of the harsh realities of class and social structure and economic struggles, “imaginaries” can be places of halcyon perfection, where values and moral behaviors are clear and confirmed, and where boundaries are also clear.

In both the Eurozone crisis and in the SCOTUS fallout, there is clear evidence of the functioning social imaginaries which invoke religion.  In Europe, this has been articulated in terms of a historic divide between “Protestant” Northern Europe and “Catholic” (and Orthodox) Southern Europe.  The Protestant north is sober, industrieous, thrifty, and “responsible” (all dimensions of Protestant Culture as defined by Max Weber) the non-Protestant south is a place where debts are forgiven and sins can be remedied through indulgences.  Here are accounts of this from Corriere della sera in Italy, News Lattitude, an online journal, Dagens Nyheter in Sweden, and a study released by the European Commission itself.

Two learnings here.  First, that religion enters such imaginaries as a powerful marker and constituent (not necessarily a source) of them.  It is a marker in that it seems to be able to coalesce a wide range of social images and cultural values under an umbrella of (often “remembered”) consensus.  It is not a matter of doctrine or theology so much as it is a looser (“Imagined”) set of connections and beliefs and commmitments.

Second, the mediated public sphere is increasingly (as modernity progresses) the place where these imaginaries are articulated, struggled over, or negotiated.  Its capacities of fluidity, fungible boundaries, embodied sensation, and invocation of tastes and sensibilities, makes the the media sphere particularly implicated in the functioning of contemporary struggles over these imaginaries.

This is a very powerful way in which “religion” and “media” come together in contemporary life.

This morning brought a fresh round of discussion of religion and American moral culture, most notably a piece in the Times by David Brooks, and piece he references, in Time, by Rod Dreher. These add to the accumulating formation of a conversation about the prospects of American religion post-2015.

Brooks and Dreher like to call this a major marker the “Post-Christian” era, where a long-term decline in the force and significance of Christianity in American culture has become more obvious.

I’d like to respond to two claims in Brooks’s piece that deserve elaboration. First, Brooks sees the decline of Christianity entirely in terms of its waning influence on social values. What Dreher calls “Orthodox” Christianity (and by this he does not mean Eastern Orthodoxy, of course) no longer rules.

There are two parts to this. First, it is mistaken to conflate all of Christianity under one banner when considering this period of “decline.” In fact, Protestantism and Catholicism have distinct histories in this period of change and it obscures much to think of them together. And, I might add, a lot of ideology is wrapped up in exactly what period we have in mind? Do we mean across the whole of the 20th-Century (from the rise of the Fundamentalist movement onward)? Do we mean from mid-Century (where the role of the Neo-Evangelical movement comes to the fore)? Do we mean from the 80s onward (when Catholic conservatives began to come into full alliance with pro-Life Protestants)? Each of these “eras” binds you to a different version of the history, of authority, of the equities involved, and of the political and civic consequences.

Second, Brooks’s argument that “decline” must be seen entirely in moral terms is also debatable. Much of the language about “decline” speaks not to the influence of religious authority on the practice of social values but instead to the location of religious authority in public moral discourse, in the civic spaces where the consensual values of the culture are negotiated. In fact, religious authority lost its ability to direct social practice long ago, probably around the time that divorce rates in the US began their inexorable climb.

No, this whole argument is about something other than “values” per se, it is about who has the right to say–and where. Will “religion” ever again be able to be a singular voice in the culture in the way it once was?

But was it?

This is where it gets very complicated. We need to remember that for most of its history, this has been a nation defined, religiously, as Protestant, and defined by Protestant principles and by the authority of a Protestant Establishment. The era when that was the case (when was that exactly?). Certainly well before the 60s (about that I can agree with David Brooks). And when that authority was in that position—historians tell us—it was already itself needing to accommodate to religious change and religious diversity.

In fact, the reaction of the Establishment churches to the 60s evidenced this confrontation. That is what they are now excoriated for by conservatives like Brooks and Ross Douthat. In their view, Liberal Protestantism lost its way when it failed to “confront” the social revolution that roiled the North Atlantic West in the 60s.  This is a profound mis-reading of what the Protestant Establishment could have done and might have done and what might be possible for pretenders to that mantle (Orthodox Christians?) today.

There is a lot more that could be said, but I’ll again revert to my role as a scholar of religion and the media to point out how much of this is actually about media and mediation. The media in fact are the geography on which these battles were and are fought out, and it is articulation of the symbolic meaning of religious authority or ascendancy in public (and therefore its mediated presence) that is the motive force in all this. And, authority itself through much of this period of change has been media authority. Brooks himself, in the piece that occasioned my writing here, points to figures like Jerry Falwell as examples of a possible Conservative “dead-ender” reaction to all this change.

In the mid-20th Century, media changed everything for religion, including creating a space or a context for struggle over the symbolic meaning of which religions are “up” and which are “down” and how we even define things like “Christian Orthodoxy.” Why search for answers in supposedly concrete and material spheres like “social values” when we should be understanding this as a debate over various imaginations of religion?

As promised, here are some more developed thoughts on the roiling debates following the Supreme Court’s June decisions.

As I suspected last week, the decisions supporting Obamacare and gay marriage are being met by an emerging opposition that is choosing to argue their case as a question of “religious liberty.” As this discourse develops, it seems to me that it will be important to keep track of two important vectors.

First, it is critical that we unpack and get to the roots of these claims, claims that have sources in American religious(specifically Protestant) history and more importantly in the history of the way Protestant and other religious authority have been and will be articulated in American public culture. This claim about religious liberty is by no means as innocuous nor as simple as it seems. Invoking what seem to be unproblematic understandings of First Amendment principles, this claim—or these claims—in fact rest on some commonplaces and assumptions that must be unpacked. They must be understood in terms of their historical roots and in terms of their history of circulation in the American “common culture.”

Second, it is critical to keep an eye on how the press, reporters, journalists of various kinds, the (excuse the hackneyed expression) “mainstream media,” the public common cultural conversation that is today constituted by the circulation of stories, claims and narratives by various forms of media and mediation treat these ongoing developments.

As an observer of religion and media, I have some things to say about each of these vectors, and I intend to follow the course of this discourse, both for what it might do in contemporary politics and for what it tells us about the way media are integrated into the generation of religion as well as the public understanding of religion today.

It should go without saying that I consider the claim that “religious liberty” is somehow threatened by these decisions to be specious. I hope that my unpacking of its sources and its meanings will help me make this point more substantively as I go along. But I’ll re-state what I wrote last time, that the easiest way to test the claim is to engage in the thought experiment of asking these claimants precisely how such and such a trend or decision or whatever actually affects their practice of their religion. What does this mean?

As I said there, specific claims in this direction vary in their plausibility. The fear that pastors would be forced to perform gay weddings or that congregations would be forced to accept gay members is preposterous on its face. Conversely, there could be challenges to rules at faith-based colleges and other institutions that choose to accept Federal money, and businesses that provide public services or public accommodation could find themselves facing discrimination charges.

But, to consider these latter cases to be cases of religious exercise should be subjected to scrutiny before it would be accepted as fact.

How, exactly, these are issues of media and religion should become clearer as look at the active forces in the ongoing discourse. They includes such thing as the globally-circulated (and heavily mediated) “Christian persecution” movement. They include the public advocacy of organizations such as The Little Sisters of the Poor, the Catholic health agency that wishes to make a public (again mediated) case for how ACA requirements on contraception coverage infringe on their “practice” of their religion. Importantly, they include media voices at the boundary between journalism and public religious discourse (New York Times columnists David Brooks and Ross Douthat are examples, as are the “neo-atheists” Richard Dawkins and Sam Harris) who hold singular authority in “the media” as definers of contemporary religion, religious authenticity, the boundary between “private” and “public” religion, etc. They include loud and prominent voices of conservative social values (under the imprimatur of religion) in the heavily-mediated Evangelical and (often media-obsessed) Catholic realms. They also include less-prominent and less-mediated voices from other religions, such as those who welcomed and supported the SCOTUS decisions. Finally, there are historians of religion and of American public discourse (such as the Berkeley Historian David Hollinger) who have recently begun to unpack the warp and woof of the public religious culture of the last century, specifically the meaning and implications of the fall of the former Protestant Establishment.

You see, I am convinced that this must all be seen in the context of this latter history—that we need to understand how the mediated public cultures of American religions and their rising and falling prospects explain better what is going on than some claim about “Christian-“ or “religious persecution.”

This all is about the “public imagination of religion” as much as it is about real material things or real legal or political possibilities. And that—the public imaginary—is a media matter.

To be continued.

Last week’s Supreme Court Decisions on the Affordable Care Act, and (to a greater extent) Marriage open a serious set of questions.  Questions about which I plan a longer post or series of posts. But for now, there’s a central and timely issue.

Opponents of these decisions (and in the case of the ACA the relevant opposition focuses on requirements for reproductive-health coverage) emerged quickly today in a remarkably consistent set of talking points, whether at the national or state level or local level.  These talking points are articulated around the question of “religious liberty.”

For a media scholar, the immediate frame here is how American journalism rises to the occasion of analyzing this essentially political debate where “religion” is invoked.   The record is not a strong one. Aside from the relatively consistent record of competence among religion reporters at the metro dailies, American reporters and editors have shown a pretty dismal record of understanding and covering religion.

And, unfortunately, so far, their performance in the emerging discourse here has not been reassuring.

I will argue here and elsewhere that the question of “religious liberty” in relation to the marriage decision is in fact a canard, a fallacious misdirection of the issues away from the central questions which have to do with the place of religion in the modern secular state.  And, because it is about “religion,” reporters seem prone to abandon their normal standards of skepticism. And we will all suffer for this.

I’m convinced that this “religious liberty” discourse rests on a mis-reading and mis-understanding of American Protestant history.  It is not actually about religious practice, but about generalized sentiments in American public moral culture.  That culture used to be the province of a Protestant Establishment (at least before the 1960s).  Aspirants to that level of moral authority today (in the case of this week’s discussions–mostly Protestant Evangelicals and the Catholic Bishops) want to re-create a time that either did not exist, or did not work in the way they imagine it did.  I’ll write more about this, but Protestant culture, for all of its influence on American culture, did not effectively guarantee a moral atmosphere in a way that can be reproduced today (something that these aspirants seem to want).  The Protestant Establishment in fact realized that it could no longer assume that role, and may have chosen actually to abandon it–a matter for historians to unpack.

What this means is that it will not be possible to have a culture “diversity of religious liberties” of the kind they imagine.  Reporters need to understand that these claims about “religious liberty” are not as straightforward and  innocuous as they seem, they involve some clear–and controversial–assumptions about what religious cultures imagine they should be able to do.

As opponents were interviewed in the early hours of these two decisions, their concerns were articulated in two ways that are quite telling. First, it has been said again and again that they fear that federal law will impose on conservative pastors a requirement to preside  at gay marriages or that congregations will be forced to accept gay couples as members.

I could go into detail (but won’t take the time) about how preposterous a scenario this is.

The second concern articulated around these decisions is the opprobrium that supposedly will be heaped on people who–for religious reasons–do not wish to support gay marriage (wedding-cake makers and florists are mentioned).  This is also a fascinating scenario, but one that reveals just how much this debate is about moral sentiment and atmosphere–an atmosphere that may never have actually existed.

At the basis of all this is a real lament, a lament that traces back 60 years or more–at least to the School Prayer decision.  These voices and forces see the world in those terms, that that moral culture has been in decline for over half a century and is what is under assault today.

Reporters need to understand and reveal through their reporting that the issue is less about “religious liberty” than it is about this lost moral culture.

Instead, through these early hours and days, in interview after interview (and yes, NPR and PBS, you have been as guilty as anyone) reporters have let the claim that this is about “religious liberty” just hang there.  I’d encourage them to think in terms of a follow-up question that would begin to reveal the issues in ways that would be actually relevant to the political and constitutional issues here.

The question would be something like this: “…tell me exactly how does this decision affects your exercise of your religion?”   And then to evaluate the answers with the same level of skepticism and critique they apply when interviewing a business or political leader.  This would be enlightening and actually push the discourse forward.

And, another issue of journalistic competence:  again and again “religion” has been defined only as Conservative Protestantism and the Catholic Bishops.  The New York Times slipped through (thank you Laurie Goodstein!) a story about a liberal Protestant denomination–the United Church of Christ–which supports the Court’s decision on marriage (a story that I now see has evaporated and is undiscoverable on the Times website).  But aside from that, by and large, the American news audience could be excused for assuming that the only religious voices that matter are the Conservative ones.

We’ll see how things develop from here….

Fox News’s Bill O’Reilly seems intent on achieving a singular status as “America’s Grumpy Old Man Next Door.”  His latest intervention is his commentary on the Recent Pew Data on American religious identity.  He makes two questionable assumptions: First, that these data mean that “religion” is actually declining. Second, that some “thing” is responsible.  For O’Reilly, the culprit is Hip-Hop and other popular culture.

Two things to keep in mind. First, while I’d argue that media are in fact at the center of these changes, their role is more complex than critics such as O’Reilly assume.  Second, while things are changing in the world of religion, it may not be accurate to describe these changes as religious decline.  In fact, any serious assessment of these changes sees that the media in various forms in fact encourage these trends. But, they do so not by contesting religion but by enabling new forms and new expressions of religion.

But, it would be unlikely that Bill O’Reilly or others of his persuasion would bother to look into matters in enough detail to see this, or that they would be able to recognize what is actually going on.  One of the main reasons is that critiques such as this rely on received, essentialized, “orthodoxic” versions of religion.

…And on istrumentalized versions of “media” and “popular culture.”

It’s been nearly a month now since a controversy boiled to the surface over the sexism and misogyny that seems endemic in some videogame genres. It achieved national attention after a prominent feminist gamer and critic-of-gaming, Anita Sarkeesian, cancelled a public appearance out of fear for her safety. Her story revealed that this was only the latest in a long saga of anonymous intimidation by self-styled defenders of the purity of the gaming genre.

I’ll not belabor the points or the history here. Good accounts of the overall controversy can be found in the New York Times. It reveals a fascinating web of discourse and practice in what Nabil Echchaibi and I call a “third space” of digital/media interaction—a separate context afforded by digital and online practices within which substantive communities of practice and shared values and share purpose can form—for good or ill. On one level, who knew that real cultural struggles were taking place around gender in gaming and in ways that would find expression in resistive, even potentially violent practice? Thus is the emergent substantiveness of these spaces.

Sarkeesian offered a convincing analysis of the evolution of the emergent cultural form of the gaming-community-of-discourse in a piece in the Times (you can also see some fascinating responses here). Her point: that the world of gaming was changing due to the demands of shifting demographics within its markets—demographics which are increasingly demanding less violent and masculinist game forms. It’s “game over” for the throwback gamers, in her view. Thus is the feminist critique engaged in actual practice in actual marketplaces—akin to the portentious political shifts that seem to be on the horizon due to immigration in the IRL-world of politics.

The controversy reveals something else that seems important to me, and this coming from research Curtis Coats and I are publishing soon in a book titled Does God Make the Man?: Media, Religion, and the Crisis of Masculinity. Look for it next year from NYU Press. In it we discuss what we learned from talking to men about their ideas of masculinity. There are a couple of insights relevant to “gamergate.” First, as is revealed by the reactions to Sarkeesian and other Feminist critics, a vibrant neo-traditionalist strain remains in American discourses of gender. We identified this as a kind of “elemental” masculinity that sees the essence of masculine purpose in the three “Ps”: Provision, Protection, and Purpose.

The genres of games at the center of this controversy are all about the three “Ps.” Thus what is at issue is not some trivial sense of the masculine gaze and its prerogatives (though that is clearly present here). It is deeper than that. And this brings us to a second learning, that gender discourse today is reflexive and self-conscious. We have ideas about gender and we also have ideas about where those ideas about gender come from and we argue and struggle over those. For the most conservative men we interviewed, feminism loomed large as a direct threat to masculine prerogatives and the opportunities to “just be a man” by pursuing the elemental purposes of manliness.

We can perhaps see, then, that for some of the neo-traditionalist defenders of traditional gaming genres, this is a very serious matter as these games might well seem to them to be one of the last refuges where the real stuff of masculinity was allowed to be worked on and worked out, without the inconvenient framing of broader social and cultural narratives of inclusion and fairness.

I attended two sessions at the recent meetings of the International Communication Association (my primary scholarly home) that came into conversation with one another in the hearing and reflecting.

The first was an otherwise very fine Popular Communication Panel, “Sounds Global: Popular Music, Politics, and Discourse.” The second was a plenary panel titled “Do Disciplines Matter?”

In the “Sounds Global” panel, we were treated to a rich set of papers dealing with particular locations of popular expression, with varying implications in gender, politics, globalization, and violence. One paper dealt with the trajectory of image-making in pop music, looking at a popular female Korean Wave group. It followed their evolution in form toward international markets and noted the sexual, gestural, and gendered dimensions of this shift. A second looked at rap music in the Turkish Community in Germany as a resistive force, with an elaborate and layered analysis of the ways this has evolved in the form of specific groups and rappers. The third focused on popular and generational online discourses of resistance In Iran, including reflection on media meta-discourses, including tensions between Iranian and diasporic media voices. A fourth concentrated on mediated resistance in Norway in the wake of the Otoya massacre carried out by an ultra-nationalist skinhead.

In the panel on disciplines the discussion centered around the conundrum of disciplinary distinction and rigor on the one hand and the need for interdisciplinarity and dialogue on the other. Both are important, one can be emphasized at the expense of the other, etc. but, the first panel illustrates yet another value of disciplinarity.

Each of the presentations connected its chosen phenomenon with the deep and rich panoply of culturalist theory-making around identities, mediation, and public representation. The paper from Korea focused on how the particularized and original effervescence of this pop group was gradually integrated into the global pop-culture (specifically the “Korean Wave”) scene and the concessions it made and the gestures, expressions, and representations that marked this evolution. These included gestures of gendered bodily display and discursive performativity. The paper on dissident rap in Germany looked at the work of male and female rap artists in the immigrant community and the means and methods of distinction and particularity they adopted, negotiating evolving standards of “German-ness” in relation to “other-ness,” and the tools of cultural distinction and difference available to them. The Iran paper looked at the affordances of digital and other media to support voices of resistance and dissidence in Iran. Youth culture, in particular, is rising in new and nuanced ways against the dominant public cultures of Iran, and these media artists want to assert a uniquely Iranian voice in what has become a global flow of diasporic discourse, much of it dominated by voices outside Iran. Finally, the paper that looked at the Norwegian massacre concentrated on a specific hip-hop group that arose in the aftermath, voicing immigrant concerns about the ultra-nationalist streams of influence present in the mainstream parties in Norway.

Each of these papers referred to important literatures related to culturalist media analysis. Feminist, post-colonialist, intersectionalist and polymediatic ideas were brought to bear. All were good and all were compelling.

One very obvious thing was missing: religion. Each of these papers trod turf rife with religious history, conflict, meanings, attributions, claims, and exclusions. It is hard to think about standards of public performativity around culture in contemporary Korea without at least framing the role that Protestantism has played in framing public culture there, particularly as regards women, their roles and their representations. The resistant voices in Germany were Turkish, and thus at least nominally rooted in Islam and its histories and traditions of expression, meaning-making, and politics, and its internal struggles over forces which wish to articulate valid and legitimate claims to different visions of modernity—this project heavily inflected by Turkey’s experience with integration or non-integration into Europe. The public culture of Iran is, of course Shia Muslim. There is so much to be learned about the capacities and affordances of religiously-inflected cultures such as Iran’s to support or nuance or layer resistance, and the cultural and symbolic resources that might be involved. Finally, ethno-nationalism across Europe is heavily and troublingly inflected with religion. (Anders Brevik, the shooter in the Otoya massacre was an example of this—many headlines read “was Brevik a Christian terrorist?”). Modern Europe is, of course, stunningly secular (particularly in comparison with the US), but this ethnonationalist development seems in layered and nuanced ways to be inflected with religion, with “the religious,” or with “cultural religion” (see, for example the debates over religion that arose during the drafting of the European Constitution).

So what is my point here, how does this relate to disciplines in the field of communication?

Each of these papers could have benefitted greatly from a careful review of these religion-related dimensions. Why didn’t they? I asked the question of religion in the panel, and it was clear that all four panelists agreed that it was a gap. So why did this occur? It was not the fault of these young scholars.

It is simple. There is a gap in the literatures–in the discipline(s). There were no widely-circulated articles, no contending theories, no commonly-known arguments to refer to, as there were in the other literatures that *were* referred to to great benefit to these projects. The fields of mass communication, cultural studies, and media studies, in which these papers were situated, have a gap in knowledge when it comes to religion. Much could be said and written about this and about why this is the case.

To the question of the value of disciplines, this is a value: they provide frameworks, languages, theories, methods, arguments, and ongoing trajectories of scholarly discourse. They cannot be ignored. Could any of the papers I’ve described have “gotten away” without referring to gender or to post-colonial theory?

So, for a lot of not-so-good reasons, there is still a scholarly “blind spot” around religion, and our scholarship and broader public knowledge are the poorer for that fact.

The death of Fred Phelps today marks a turning point of some kind, I am sure.  I don’t wish to overplay his significance, or be complicit inImage his self-promotion, and I certainly disagreed with both his practices and his theology.

Nonetheless, Phelps’s “Westboro Baptist Church,”  which appeared from the outside to be less “church” and more “advocacy organization,” achieved a great deal in terms of publicity.  It would have been more effective, perhaps, if the rhetoric had not been so strained.  The tenuous connection between progress on gay rights and deaths in war made so little intuitive sense to the general public mind.

There is an element of the Phelps phenomenon that interests me as a student of media and religion. That is the curious challenge his efforts posed to journalism.  Was it a “church?”  Was it “politics?”  “What was it?”  The fact that it claimed to be a “church” certainly afforded it a zone of legal protection (and advocacy by even the ACLU from time to time), but it also seemed to give it a similar zone of deference from some in journalism.   When it occurred, this deference was rooted in a long-standing convention whereby journalism chooses not to investigate religions on the basis of their truth claims.  Journalists who would not be shy about looking under the skirts of corporate power have become weak in the knees when it comes to religion, time and again.

Was this good professional practice in the case of Fred Phelps?  Surely not.  Why not include in every story about Westboro a note that it was a marginal expression of a marginal faith, that it represented so few people that it was hardly worth legitimating?

To do so would have meant engaging in a kind of evaluation that journalism rarely does when it comes to the religion beat.  As a result, Westboro got a kind of “pass” from the press. It will be interesting to see whether the post mortems on Phelps involve any self-reflection on these issues.

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